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WYOMING LAW JOURNAL
gage of brands and marks, as such, but only when specifically provided for in
the mortgage. Such statutes, then, only serve to accentuate the novel features
presented by Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 Sec. 59-102.
JOSEPH F. MAIER

MIGRATORY DIVORCES SINCE WILLIAMS V. NORTH CAROLINA

In 1940, Otis Williams and Lillie Hendrix, domiliciaries of North Carolina, went to Nevada to obtain divorces from their respective spouses. After
satisfying the residence requirement under the Nevada statute, each of them
obtained a divorce. Both divorces were granted on constructive service. They
married and returned to North Carolina where they lived together as husbandand wife until they were convicted.of bigamous cohabitation. The North Carolina Supreme Court sustained the convictions.' The decision was based on Haddock v. Haddock2 which held that the state of New York, the matrimonial domicile where the wife still resided, need not give full faith and credit to a foreign
decree obtained by the husband who wrongfully left his wife in the matrimonial
domicile, service on her having been obtained by publication.
In a 1942 decision known as Williams v. North Carolina 1,3 the Supreme
Court of the United States reversed a judgment of conviction by expressly overruling Haddock v. Haddock and holding that if either spouse is domiciled in a
state where a divorce is granted upon constructive service, the divorce must be
recognized in other states irrespective of whether it was rendered by a court of
the matrimonial domicile. The United States Supreme Court had previously
said, in Bell v. Bell,4 that no valid divorce could be decreed, on constructive
service, by courts of a state in which neither party was domiciled. The rule of
Bell v. Bell is still followed in modern decisions, 5 but the United States Supreme
Court refused to consider this rule in Williams I because the State of North
Carolina did not seek to sustain the judgment on that ground.6
In 1944, the Supreme Court of North Carolina again sustained the decision
of bigamous cohabitation in the case of State v. Williams. 7 The court looked
into the question of domicil and based the decision on Bell v. Bell instead of
Haddock v. Haddock by reasoning that, since the jury found that the petitioners
were actually domiciled in North Carolina when they brought their actions
for divorce in Nevada, they had not acquired a bona fide domicil in Nevada and
therefore the foreign decrees were void in North Carolina. In 1945, the SuState v. Williams, (1941) 220 N. C. 445, 17 S. E. (2d) 769.
(1906) 201 U. S. 562, 26 Sup. Ct. 525, 50 L. Ed. 867, 5 Ann. Cas. 1.
(1942) 317 U. S. 287, 63 Sup. Ct. 207, 87 L. Ed. 279, 143 A. L. R. 1273.
(1900) 181 U. S. 175, 21 Sup. Ct. 551, 45 L. Ed. 804.
Evans v. Evans, (D. C. C. A. 1945) 149 F. (2d) 831. Cert. denied (1945) 326 U. S.
738, 66 Sup. Ct. 48. 90 L. Ed. 43; Cohen v. Cohen. (Mass. 1946) 64 N. E. (2d) 689,
163 A. L. R. 362; Hall v. Hall. (Miss. 1946) 24 So. (2d) 347; Reed v. State, (Tex.
Cr. App. 1944) 127 S. W. (2d) 660.
6. Williams v. North Carolina, (1942) 317 U. S. 287, 63 Sup. Ct. 207, 87 L. Ed. 279,
143 A. L. R. 1273.
7. (1944) 224 N. C. 183, 29 S. E. (2d) 744.
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NOTES
preme Court of the United States, on a second appeal, known as Williams v.
North Carolina II, affirmed the conviction and held that, notwithstanding the
full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution, a decree of divorce rend-

ered in one state may be impeached collaterally and denied recognition in another, upon the ground that neither of the parties had a bona fide domicil at the
flivorce forum.3

Since the Williams I decision, a foreign divorce obtained by constructive
service of process upon a non-resident defendant has been held to be valid and

entitled to extraterritorial recognition, if other jurisdictional requisites are present. 9 As a result of the Williams II decision, many, who had placed a feeling

of security in their foreign divorce, have returned home to find themselves embroiled in litigation. For example, in Hall v. Hall,'° a doctor left his wife in
Mississippi and proceeded to Nevada where he passed the medical examination
required to practice medicine in Nevada and actually engaged in such practice
pending the divorce hearing. After the Nevada divorce was granted, the doctor
returned to Mississippi and resumed his practice there. The Mississippi Supreme
Court found that a bona fide domicil had not been established in Nevada and
refused to give full faith and credit to the Nevada decree. In Evans v. Evans,"
the United States Court of Appeals followed Williams II by stating that the
finding of the Nevada court as to existence of domicil in that State, in an uncontest case, is not binding upon the courts of the District of Columbia under
the full faith and credit provision of the Federal Constitution. White v. White12
fell in line with Williams II by stating that, where the conduct of the husband
bore the earmarks of a trip to Florida for the sole purpose of securing a divorce
with no intention of establishing a permanent residence, the Florida decree was
not entitled to full faith and credit and was no defense in a suit by the wife for
maintenance in the District of Columbia. However, the burden of proving the
invalidity of the foreign decree is upon the one assailing it as such decree is considered prima facie valid.' 3 Where the burden of proof is not met, the divorce
is entitled to recognition. In Davis v. Davis,1 the foreign decree was upheld
where the evidence showed that the husband was affected with tuberculosis and
that he had gone to Nevada for his health and not for the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce, in spite of the fact that he remarried as soon as the divorce
was granted. The report of this case does not indicate whether or not the husband returned to California to live.
Black, J., in his dissenting opinion in Williams II, asserted that, "Statistics
indicate that approximately five million divorced persons are scattered throughS. (1945) 325 U. S.226, 65 Sup. Ct. 1092, 89 L. Ed. 1577, 157 A. L. R. 1366.

9. Calhoun v. Calhoun, (1945)

70 Cal. App. (2d) 233, 160 P. (2d) 923; Herman v.

Herman, (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1945) 57 N. Y. S. (2d) 614; Re Codling, (1945)

(2d) 261, 160 P. (2d) 635.
10. (Miss. Sup. Ct. 1946) 24 So. (2d) 347.
11. (D. C. C. A. 1945) 149 F. (2d) 831, Cert. Denied (1945)
48, 90 L. Ed. 43.

23 Wash.

326 U. S.738, 66 Sup. Ct.

12. (App. D. C. 1945) 150 F. (2d) 157.

13. Herman v. Herman, (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1945) 57 N. Y. S. (2d) 614; Dalton v. Dalton
(1945) 270 App. Div. 269, 59 N. Y. S. (2d) 68.
14. (1945) 71 Cal. App. (2d) 150, 162 P. (2d) 62.

WYOMING LAW JOURNAL

out the forty-eight states. More than 85% of these divorces were granted in
uncontested proceedings. Not one of this latter group can now retain any feeling of security in his divorce decree."' s This statement implies that the contested
out-of-state divorces are free from collateral attack unless the contested hearing
was on the jurisdictional fact of domicil. In 1938, the United States Supreme
Court in the case of Davis v. Davis,"' held that, if the defendant makes an appearance for the purpose of contesting the jurisdiction of the divorce court for
lack of domicil in the divorce forum, and that issue is specifically considered
and decided in favor of the existence of such a domicil, the decree is entitled to
1
foreign recognition. This rule has since been applied in Pratt v. Miedema. 7
The Supreme Court of Michigan in that case stated that a divorce decree by a
Nevada court in favor of the wife, in a suit where the husband appeared and
claimed that the wife had not secured a bona fide domicil in Nevada, was res
judicata of the issue of the wife's fraud in obtaining residence in Nevada. Further, that under the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution,
the decree must be respected in the Michigan courts in the wife's suit to recover
accrued installments of alimony under such decree. The Supreme Court of
Missouri applied the same rule in Keller v. Keller e by holding that, where the
defendant was present and had the opportunity to raise the issue of domicil, the
Nevada decree was conclusive on that issue. The record of this case does not
disclose that any contest on the question of domicil was actually had which implies that, since the wife had her day in court and the court found that the husband was a bona fide resident of Nevada, the husband's bona fide residence was
res judicata, and the Missouri courts were bound to give full faith and credit
to the divorce decree. In Shea v. Shea,'9 the Appellate Division of the New York
Supreme Court clearly stated that a foreign divorce decree may not be attacked
collaterally where the defendant personally appeared and the issue of residence
was contested in the foreign jurisdiction or where the opportunity was present
to do so and the issue was not litigated.
On the other hand, some have taken the view that, even where the defendant has made a personal appearance in the foreign divorce court, the divorce
decree may still be collaterally attacked in a later suit by the defendant. In
Giresi v. Giresi,20 the Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey allowed the
wife to challenge the validity of a Nevada divorce decree on the ground that the
husband was not a bona fide resident of Nevada, notwithstanding the fact that
the wife appeared generally in the Nevada suit by filing an answer and also accepting money for the suit that had been awarded by the Nevada Court. The
decision was based on Feickert v. Feickert,2l a prior New Jersey decision, which
set forth the view that, while ordinarily one may not challenge the jurisdiction
T

15. Williams v. North Carolina, (1945) 325 U. S. 226, 65 Sup. Ct. 1092, 89 L. Ed. 1577,
157 A. L. R. 1366.
16. (1938) 305 U. S. 32, 59 Sup. Ct. 3, 83 L. Ed. 26.
17. (1945) 311 Mich. 64, 18 N. W. (2d) 279, Cert. denied (1945) 326 U. S. 739, 66 Sup.
Ct. 49, 90 L. Ed. 43.
18. (1944) .352 Mo. 877, 179 S. W. (2d) 728.
19. (1946) 294 N. Y. 904, 60 N. Y. S. 823.
20. (1945) 137 N. J. Eq. 336, 44 A. (2d) 345.
21. (1926) 98 N. J. Eq. 444, 131 Atl. 576.
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of a court after the entry of a general appearance, divorce decrees in another

state present an exception in that, in such cases, the public is a party and the
jurisdictional defect of lack of domicil cannot be waived by appearance of the
parties where neither are domiciled in the divorce forum. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Cohen v. Cohen,22 followed the rule of the
Giresi case by stating that the filing of an appearance by the defendant in a divorce suit in a state in which neither party is domiciled does not cure the jurisdictional defect. The court explained that the rule of Davis v. Davis2 3 does not
apply unless the jurisdictional facts are actually litigated even though the wife
did make an appearance, file -an answer and a cross complaint, and cause witnesses to appear by deposition.
Mr. Thomas Reed Powell of the Harvard Law School has suggested the
following safety rules for securing a divorce under the present state of the law:
'Those who wish the benefit of easier divorce laws must really live in states
which have them. To be really safe, those who are newcomers should live on
in those states after they have received their dispensation. If later they wish to
live elsewhere, they should have some good reason for doing so, a reason that
will not cast doubt on their earlier intention to make a home and dwell indefinitely in the divorcing state."24
A recent survey revealed that the number of divorces reached a new peak
in the United States in 1946. Reno, Nevada reported 11,000 in that city alone,
which surpassed the the previous record of 8,500 set in 1945.25 Since Wyoming
is one of the three states with the most lenient residence requirements for divorce,2 6 it is reasonable to assume that lawyers in this state are doing a good
share of the "migratory" divorce business out of which most of the legal complications evolve. There are, no doubt, many fact situations in which Mr.
Powell's safety rules are too cautious; but it would seem good policy for every
lawyer to explain the possible unfortunate results to his client when consulted
about such cases.
FLomD D. GORRELL

"HEART BALM" LEGISLATION AND THE CONSTITUTION
In recent years there has been wide-spread acceptance of the view that the
causes of action for breach of promise to marry, seduction, alienation of affections, and criminal conversation have afforded a fertile field for blackmail and
extortion by means of manufactured suits in which the threat of publicity is
used to force a settlement. Consequently fifteen states have passed what are
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

(Mass. 1946) 64 N. E. (2d) 689, 163 A. L. R. 362.
(1938) 305 U. S. 32, 59 Sup. Ct. 3, 83 L. Ed. 26.
Powell, and Repent at Leisure, (1945) 38 Harv. L. Rev. 930.
United Press Dispatch, Jan. 14, 1947.
Warren, Schouler Divorce Manual (1944) pp. 705-720.

